We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by means of 'monotonic' properties, with the iterated elimination of strategies that do not satisfy these properties. It allows us to deduce the customary results concerned with true common beliefs of rationality and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies as simple corollaries. This approach relies on Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem.
Introduction

Background
Epistemic analysis of strategic games (in short, games) aims at predicting the choices of rational players in the presence of (partial or common) knowledge or belief about the behaviour of other players. Most often it focusses on the iterated elimination of never best responses (a notion termed as rationalizability), the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) and on justification of the strategies selected in Nash and correlated equilibria.
Starting with Aumann [1987] , Brandenburger and Dekel [1987] and Tan and Werlang [1988] a large body of literature arose that investigates the epistemic foundations of rationalizability by modelling the reasoning employed by players in choosing their strategies. Such an analysis, based either on possibility correspondences and partition spaces, or Harsanyi type spaces, is limited either to finite or compact games with continuous payoffs, or to twoplayer games, see, e.g., Battigalli and Bonanno [1999] or Ely and Peski [2006] .
In turn, in the case of IESDS the epistemic analysis has focussed on finite games (with an infinite hierarchy of beliefs) and strict dominance either by pure or by mixed strategies, see, e.g. Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2008] .
Contributions
In this paper we provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We prove a generic result that is concerned with monotonic program properties 1 used by the players to select optimal strategies.
More specifically, given a belief model for the initial strategic game, denote by RAT(φ) the property that each player i uses a property φ i to select his strategy ('each player i is φ i -rational'). We establish in Section 4 the following main result:
Assume that each property φ i is monotonic. The set of joints strategies that the players choose in the states in which RAT(φ) is a true common belief is included in the set of joint strategies that remain after the iterated elimination of the strategies that for player i are not φ i -optimal.
In general, transfinite iterations of the strategy elimination are possible. For some belief models the inclusion can be reversed.
This generic result covers the usual notion of rationalizability in finite games and a global version of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the customary, local version of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies we justify in Section 5 the statement true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for arbitrary games and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. Rationality refers here to the concept studied in Bernheim [1984] .
Strict dominance is a non-monotonic property, so the use of monotonic properties allowed us to provide epistemic foundations for non-monotonic properties. However, weak dominance, another non-monotonic property, remains beyond the reach of this approach. A mathematical reason is that its global version is also non-monotonic (see Apt [2007c] ), in contrast to strict dominance, the global version of which is monotonic. To provide epistemic foundations of weak dominance the only currently known approach is that of Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2008] based on the lexicographic probability systems.
We also provide, in Section 6, an axiomatic presentation of the above generic result. This clarifies the logical underpinnings of the epistemic analysis and shows that the use of transfinite iterations can be naturally captured by a single inference rule that involves greatest fixpoints. Also, it shows that the relevant monotonic properties can be defined using positive formulae.
Finally, inspired by van Benthem [2007] , we provide in Section 7 an alternative characterization of the strategies that remain after iterated elimination of strategies that for player i are not φ i -optimal, based on the concept of a public announcement due to Plaza [1989] . Here monotonicity is not needed and we obtain a generalization of van Benthem's results to arbitrary strategic games and to other properties than rationalizability, notably a global version of weak dominance.
Apart of the necessity of the use of transfinite iterations when studying arbitrary strategic games, our analysis shows the relevance of two concepts of the underlying properties φ i used by the players to select their strategies. The first one is monotonicity which allows us to use Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem. The second is globality, which intuitively means that each subgame obtained by iterated elimination of strategies is analyzed in the context of the given initial game. While the proposed epistemic analysis of arbitrary games based on possibility correspondences crucially depends on the use of monotonic properties, the one based on public announcement applies to global properties.
Connections
The relevance of monotonicity in the context of epistemic analysis of finite strategic games has already been pointed out in van Benthem [2007] . The distinction between local and global properties is from Apt [2007b] and Apt [2007c] .
To show that for some belief models an equality holds between the sets of joint strategies chosen in the states in which RAT(φ) a true common belief and the set of joint strategies that remain after the iterated elimination of the strategies that for player i are not φ i -optimal requires use of transfinite ordinals. This complements the findings of Lipman [1991] in which transfinite ordinals are used in a study of limited rationality, and Lipman [1994] , where a two-player game is constructed for which the ω 0 (the first infinite ordinal) and ω 0 + 1 iterations of the rationalizability operator of Bernheim [1984] differ. In turn, Heifetz and Samet [1998] show that in general arbitrary ordinals are necessary in the epistemic analysis of strategic games based on partition spaces. Further, as argued in Chen, Long and Luo [2005] , the notion of IESDSà la Milgrom and Roberts [1990] , when used for arbitrary games, also requires transfinite iterations of the underlying operator.
Some of the results presented here were initially reported in a different presentation, in Apt [2007a] .
Preliminaries
This paper connects three concepts, operators on a complete lattice, strategic games and possibility correspondences. In this section we introduce these concepts and recall basic results concerning them.
Operators
Consider a fixed complete lattice (D, ⊆ ) with the largest element ⊤. In what follows we use ordinals and denote them by α, β, γ. Given a, possibly transfinite, sequence (G α ) α<γ of elements of D we denote their join and meet respectively by α<γ G α and α<γ G α . Definition 1. Let T be an operator on (D, ⊆ ), i.e., T : D → D.
•
• We call T contracting if for all G T (G) ⊆ G.
• We say that an element G is a fixpoint of
• We define by transfinite induction a sequence of elements T α of D, where α is an ordinal, as follows:
-for all limit ordinals β, T β := α<β T α .
• We call the least α such that T α+1 = T α the closure ordinal of T and denote it by α T . We call then T α T the outcome of (iterating) T and write it alternatively as T ∞ . 2
So an outcome is a fixpoint reached by a transfinite iteration that starts with the largest element. In general, the outcome of an operator does not need to exist but we have the following classic result due to Tarski [1955] . Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem Every monotonic operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has an outcome, i.e., T ∞ is well-defined. Moreover,
where νT is the largest fixpoint of T .
In contrast, a contracting operator does not need to have a largest fixpoint. But we have the following obvious observation. Note 1. Every contracting operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has an outcome, i.e., T ∞ is well-defined.
2
In Section 5 we shall need the following lemma, that modifies the corresponding lemma from Apt [2007c] from finite to arbitrary complete lattices. Lemma 1. Consider two operators T 1 and T 2 on (D, ⊆ ) such that
Proof. We first prove by transfinite induction that for all α
By the definition of the iterations we only need to consider the induction step for a successor ordinal. So suppose the claim holds for some α. Then by the first two assumptions and the induction hypothesis we have the following string of inclusions and equalities:
This shows that for all α (1) holds. By Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and Note 1 the outcomes of T 1 and T 2 exist, which implies the claim. 2
Strategic games
Given n players (n > 1) by a strategic game (in short, a game) we mean a sequence (S 1 , . . ., S n , p 1 , . . ., p n ), where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
• S i is the non-empty set of strategies (sometimes called actions) available to player i,
• p i is the payoff function for the player i, so
where R is the set of real numbers.
We denote the strategies of player i by s i , possibly with some superscripts. Given s ∈ S 1 × . . . × S n we denote the ith element of s by s i , write sometimes s as (s i , s −i ), and use the following standard notation:
Given a finite non-empty set A we denote by ∆A the set of probability distributions over A and call any element of ∆S i a mixed strategy of player i.
In the remainder of the paper we assume an initial strategic game
. ., n}. We identify the restriction (H 1 , . . ., H n ) with H. We shall focus on the complete lattice that consists of the set of all restrictions of the game H ordered by the componentwise set inclusion:
So H is the largest element in this lattice and α<γ and α<γ are the customary set-theoretic operations on the restrictions. Consider now a restriction G := (G 1 , . . ., G n ) of H and two strategies s i , s
from H i (so not necessarily from G i ). We say that s i is strictly dominated on G by s
and that s i is weakly dominated on G by s
In the case of finite games, once the payoff function is extended in the expected way to mixed strategies, the relations ≻ G and ≻ w G between a mixed strategy and a pure strategy are defined in the same way.
A belief of player i held in G := (G 1 , . . ., G n ) can be
• a joint strategy of the opponents of player i in G (i.e., s −i ∈ G −i ),
• or, in the case the game is finite, a joint mixed strategy of the opponents of player i (i.e., (m 1 , . . ., m i−1 , m i+1 , . . ., m n ), where m j ∈ ∆G j for all j),
• or, in the case the game is finite, a correlated strategy of the opponents of player i (i.e., m ∈ ∆G −i ).
Each payoff function p i can be modified to an expected payoff function p i : G i × B i → R, where B i is one of the above three sets of beliefs of player i.
Further, given a restriction
Possibility correspondences
In this and the next subsection we essentially follow the exposition of Battigalli and Bonanno [1999] . Fix a non-empty set Ω of states. By an event we mean a subset of Ω. A possibility correspondence is a mapping from Ω to the powerset P(Ω) of Ω. We consider three properties of a possibility correspondence P :
If the possibility correspondence satisfies properties (i) and (ii), we call it a belief correspondence and if it satisfies properties (i)-(iii), we call it a knowledge correspondence.
3 Note that each belief correspondence P yields a partition {P (ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of Ω. Assume now that each player i has at its disposal a possibility correspondence P i . Fix an event E. We define
and finally
If all P i s are belief correspondences, we usually write B instead of and if all P i s are knowledge correspondences, we usually write K instead of . When ω ∈ B * E, we say that the event E is common belief in the state ω and when ω ∈ K * E, we say that the event E is common knowledge in the state ω.
By property (iii) of the possibility correspondences we have KE ⊆ E and
In what follows we shall use the following alternative characterizations of common belief and common knowledge based on the evident events:
where = B or = K (see Monderer and Samet [1989] , respectively Proposition 4 on page 180 and Proposition on page 175),
(see Aumann [1976 Aumann [ , page 1237 ). Finally, in Section 6 we shall use the following alternative characterization of common beliefs and common knowledge.
Note 2. For all belief correspondences
Proof. We have the following string of equivalences:
so the claim follows by (2). 2
Models for games
We now link these considerations with the strategic games. Given a restriction G := (G 1 , . . ., G n ) of the initial game H, by a model for G we mean a set of states Ω together with a sequence of functions s i : Ω → G i , where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We denote it by (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n ).
In what follows, given a function f and a subset E of its domain, we denote by f (E) the range of f on E and by f | E the restriction of f to E.
By the standard model M for G we mean the model in which
So the states of the standard model for G are exactly the joint strategies in G, and each s i is a projection function. Since the initial game H is given, we know the payoff functions p 1 , . . ., p n . So in the context of H a standard model is just an alternative way of representing a restriction of H. Given a (not necessarily standard) model M := (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n ) for a restriction G and a vector of events E = (E 1 , . . ., E n ) in M we define
and call it the restriction of G to E. When each E i equals E we write
Finally, we extend the notion of a model for a restriction G to a belief model for G by assuming that each player i has a belief correspondence P i on Ω. If each P i is a knowledge correspondence, we refer then to a knowledge model .
Local and global properties
The assumption that each player is rational is one of the basic stipulations within the framework of strategic games. However, rationality can be differently interpreted by different players.
4 This may for example mean that a player
• does not choose a strategy weakly/strictly dominated by another pure/mixed strategy,
• chooses only best replies to the (beliefs about the) strategies of the opponents.
In this paper we are interested in analyzing situations in which each player pursues his own notion of rationality, more specifically those situations in which this information is common knowledge or common belief. As a special case we cover then the usually analyzed situation in which all players use the same notion of rationality.
Given player i in the initial strategic game H := (H 1 , . . ., H n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) we formalize his notion of rationality using a property φ i (s i , G) that holds between a strategy s i ∈ H i and a restriction G of H. Intuitively, φ i (s i , G) holds if s i is an 'optimal' strategy for player i within the restriction G, assuming that he uses the property φ i to select optimal strategies.
We distinguish though between what we call 'local' and 'global' optimality. To assess optimality of a strategy s i locally within the restriction G, it is sufficient for i to compare s i with only those strategies s ′ i that occur in G i . On the other hand, to assess the optimality of s i globally, player i must consider all of his strategies s ′ i that occur in his strategy set H i in the initial game H.
Global properties are then those in which a player's strategy is evaluated with respect to all his strategies in the initial game, whereas local properties are concerned solely with a comparison of strategies available in the restriction G. We will write φ l when we refer to a local property, and φ g when we refer to a global property.
Here are some examples which show that the notions of rationality mentioned above can be formalized in a number of natural ways. We also give one example in both its local and global form in order to illustrate the distinction between them:
• sd l i (s i , G) that holds iff the strategy s i of player i is not strictly dominated on G by any strategy from G i (i.e., ¬∃s
that holds iff the strategy s i of player i is not strictly dominated on G by any strategy from H i (i.e., ¬∃s
• (assuming H is finite) msd l i (s i , G) that holds iff the strategy s i of player i is not strictly dominated on G by any of its mixed strategy from G, (i.e., ¬∃m
• wd l i (s i , G) that holds iff the strategy s i of player i is not weakly dominated on G by any strategy from G i (i.e., ¬∃s
that holds iff the strategy s i of player i is not weakly dominated on G by any mixed strategies over G i (i.e., ¬∃m
that holds iff the strategy s i of player i is a best response among G i to some belief µ i held in G (i.e., for some belief µ i held in G, ∀s
We say that the property φ i (·, ·) used by player i is monotonic if for all restrictions G and G ′ of H and
Each sequence of properties φ := (φ 1 , . . ., φ n ) determines an operator T φ on the restrictions of H defined by
where G := (G 1 , . . ., G n ) and for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
Since T φ is contracting, by Note 1 it has an outcome, i.e., T ∞ φ is welldefined. Moreover, if each φ i is monotonic, then T φ is monotonic and by Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem its largest fixpoint νT φ exists and equals T ∞ φ . Intuitively, T φ (G) is the result of removing from G all strategies that are not φ i -optimal. So the outcome of T φ is the result of the iterated elimination of strategies that for player i are not φ i -optimal, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
When each property φ i equals sd l , we write T sd l instead of T sd l and similarly with other specific properties. The natural examples of such an iterated elimination of strategies that were discussed in the literature are:
5
• iterated elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by another strategy;
This corresponds to the iterations of the T sd l operator in the case of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] ) and of the T sd g operator in the case of Chen, Long and Luo [2005] .
• iterated elimination of strategies that are weakly dominated by another strategy;
• (for finite games) iterated elimination of strategies that are weakly, respectively strictly, dominated by a mixed strategy;
These are the customary situations studied starting with Luce and Raiffa [1957] that correspond to the iterations of the T msd l , respectively T mwd l , operator.
• iterated elimination of strategies that are never best responses to some belief;
This corresponds to the iterations of the T br g operator in the case of Bernheim [1984] and the T br l operator in the case of Pearce [1984] , in each case for an appropriate set of beliefs.
Usually only the first ω o iterations of the corresponding operator T are considered, i.e., one studies T ω 0 , that is i<ω 0 T i , and not T ∞ . In the next section we assume that each player i employs some property φ i to select his strategies, and we analyze the situation in which this information is tru common belief or common knowledge. To determine which strategies are then selected by the players we shall use the T φ operator. We shall also explain why in general transfinite iterations are necessary.
Two theorems
Fix a belief model (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P 1 , . . ., P n ) for the initial game H. Given a property φ i (·, G) that player i uses to select his strategies in the restriction G of H, we say that player i is φ i -rational in the state ω if φ i (s i (ω), G P i (ω) ) holds. Note that when player i believes (respectively, knows) that the state is in P i (ω), the restriction G P i (ω) represents his belief (respectively, his knowledge) about the players' strategies. That is, G P i (ω) is the game he believes (respectively, knows) to be relevant to his choice. Hence φ i (s i (ω), G P i (ω) ) captures the idea that if player i uses φ i (·, ·) to select his optimal strategy in the game he considers relevant, then in the state ω he indeed acts 'rationally'.
We are interested in the strategies selected by each player in the states in which it is true and is common belief (or is common knowledge) that each player i is φ i -rational. To this end we introduce the following event:
and consider the following two events constructed out of it: K * RAT(φ) and RAT(φ) ∩ B * RAT(φ). We then focus on the corresponding restrictions
So a strategy s i is an element of the ith component of
. That is, s i is a strategy that player i chooses in a state in which it is common knowledge that each player j is φ j -rational, and similarly for G RAT(φ)∩B * RAT(φ) .
The following result then relates for arbitrary strategic games the restrictions G RAT(φ)∩B * RAT(φ) and G K * RAT(φ) to the outcome of the iteration of the operator T φ .
Theorem 1.
(i) Suppose that each property φ i is monotonic. Then for all belief models for
(ii) Suppose that each property φ i is monotonic. Then for all knowledge models for
Proof.
(i) Fix a belief model (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P 1 , . . ., P n ) for H. Take a strategy s i that is an element of the ith component of G RAT(φ)∩B * RAT(φ) . Thus we have s i = s i (ω) for some state ω such that ω ∈ RAT(φ) and ω ∈ B * RAT(φ). The latter implies by (2) that for some evident event F
Take now an arbitrary ω ′ ∈ F ∩ RAT(φ) and i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Since (φ) and by the monotonicity of φ i we conclude that
. But s i = s i (ω) and ω ∈ F ∩ RAT(φ), so we conclude by the above inclusion that s i is an element of the ith component of T ∞ φ . This proves the claim.
(ii) By the definition of common knowledge for all events E we have
(iii) We actually construct a standard belief model for H that is also a knowledge model. Suppose
. Define each possibility correspondence P i by
Each P i is a knowledge correspondence (also when F = ∅ or F = Ω) and clearly F is an evident event.
Take now an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and an arbitrary state ω ∈ F . Since T ∞ φ is a fixpoint of T φ and
), so by the definition of P i we have φ i (s i (ω), G P i (ω) ). This shows that each player i is φ i -rational in each state ω ∈ F , i.e., F ⊆ RAT(φ).
Since F is evident, we conclude by (3) that in each state ω ∈ F it is common knowledge that each player i is φ i -rational, i.e., F ⊆ K * RAT(φ). Moreover, by the definition of common knowledge
which yields the claim by (i). 2
Items (i) and (ii) show that when each property φ i is monotonic, for all belief models of H it holds that the strategy profiles that the players choose in the states in which each player i is φ i -rational and it is common belief that each player i is φ i -rational (or in which it is common knowledge that each player i is φ i -rational) are included in those that remain after the iterated elimination of the strategies that are not φ i -optimal.
Note that monotonicity of the φ i properties was not needed to establish item (iii). In Chen, Long and Luo [2005] , Lipman [1994] and Apt [2007b] examples are provided showing that for the properties of strict dominance (namely sd g ) and best response (namely br g ) in general transfinite iterations (i.e., iterations beyond ω 0 ) of the corresponding operator are necessary to reach the outcome. So to achieve the equality for them in (iii) transfinite iterations of the T φ operator are necessary.
By instantiating φ i s to specific properties we get instances of the above result that refer to specific definitions of rationality. This will allow us to relate the above result to the ones established in the literature. Before we do this we establish another result that will apply to another class of properties φ i . Proof. We extend the standard model for H by the knowledge correspondences P 1 , . . ., P n where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, P i (ω) = {ω}. Then for all ω and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
Note that any property φ i that satisfies (5) and is not trivial (that is, for some strategy s i , φ i (s i , H) does not hold) is not monotonic.
. . . and their consequences
Let us analyze now the consequences of the above two theorems. Consider first Theorem 1. The following lemma, in which we refer to the properties introduced in Section 3, clarifies the matters.
Lemma 2. The properties sd Bernheim [1984] .
In contrast, Theorem 1 does not apply to the properties wd g i and mwd g i , since, as indicated in Apt [2007c] , the corresponding operators T wd g and T mwd g are not monotonic, and hence the properties wd In particular, this theorem shows that the 'customary' concepts of strict dominance, sd l i and msd l i cannot be justified in the used epistemic framework as 'stand alone' concepts of rationality. Indeed, this theorem shows that in some knowledge models common knowledge that each player is rational in one of these two senses does not exclude any strategy.
What can be done is to justify these two concepts as consequences of the common knowledge of rationality defined in terms of br g i , the 'global' version of the best response property, Namely, we have the following result. When each property φ i equals br g i , we write here RAT(br g ) instead of RAT(br g ).
Theorem 3.
(i) For all belief models
(ii) for all knowledge models
where in both situations we take as the set of beliefs the set of joint strategies of the opponents.
Proof. (i) By Lemma 2 and Theorem 1(i) G RAT(br
g . Each best response to a joint strategy of the opponents is not strictly dominated, so for all restrictions G T br
l , which concludes the proof. (ii) By (i) and the fact that
Item (ii) formalizes and justifies in the epistemic framework used here the often used statement: common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for games with arbitrary strategy sets and transfinite iterations of the elimination process, and when for the set of beliefs of a player we take the set of joint strategies of his opponents.
In the case of finite games we have the following well-known result implicitly stated in Brandenburger and Dekel [1987] and explicitly formulated in Stalnaker [1994] (see Battigalli and Bonanno [1999, page 181] ). For a proof using Harsanyi type spaces see . Theorem 4. Assume the initial game H is finite.
(i) For all belief models for H G RAT(br
(ii) for all knowledge models for H
where in both situations we take as the set of beliefs the set of joint mixed strategies of the opponents.
Proof. The argument is analogous as in the previous proof but relies on a subsidiary result and runs as follows. (i) Again by Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 G RAT(br [1994, page 60] (that is a modification of the original result of Pearce [1984] ) for all restrictions G we have
l , which yields the conclusion. (ii) By (i) and the fact that
6 Axiomatic presentation
It is natural to ask what proof-theoretic principles about the players' reasoning we are assuming in the proof of Theorem 1(i). To answer this question we present in this section a formal language L ν that will be interpreted over belief models. We will then give syntactic proof rules for L ν that lead to an axiomatic proof of Theorem 1(i). Throughout the section we assume, as usual, the initial game H and monotonic properties φ 1 , . . ., φ n . Later we shall introduce a language that allows us to define and analyze the relevant properties.
To start with, we consider the simpler language L the formulae of which are defined by the following recursive definition, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}:
where each rat i is a constant. We abbreviate the formula i∈{1,. . .,n} rat i to rat, i∈{1,. . .,n} i ψ to ψ and i∈{1,. . .,n} O i ψ to Oψ.
Formulae of L will be interpreted as events in belief models for H. Given a belief model (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P 1 , . . ., P n ) for H, we define the interpretation function I(·) : L → P(Ω) as follows:
Note that I(rat) is the event RAT(φ) that every player is rational, I( ψ) is the event I(ψ) that every player believes the event I(ψ) and I(Oψ) is the event that every player's strategy is optimal in the context of the restriction
L is a modal language in the sense of Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema [2001] . Although L can express some connections between our formal definitions of optimality, rationality and beliefs, it is not a very expressive language. If our interest were to reason about particular games, we could extend the language with atoms s i expressing the event that the strategy s i is chosen. This choice is often made when defining modal languages for models of games, see, e.g., de Bruin [2004] . However, we are interested in a finite language that would allow us to reason about games with arbitrary strategy sets, and in particular in a language that can express the inclusion of Theorem 1(i).
Specifically, we want a language that can express the following statement:
Imp If it is true common belief that every player is rational, then all players choose strategies that survive the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
To this end we extend the vocabulary of L with a single set variable denoted by x and the largest fixpoint operator νx. (The corresponding extension of the first-order logic by the dual, least fixpoint operator µx was first studied in Gurevich [1984] .) Modulo one caveat the resulting language L ν is defined as follows, where '. . .' stands for the already given definition of L:
The caveat is the following: φ must be
• positive in x, which means that each occurrence of x in φ is under the scope of an even number of negation signs (¬),
• ν-free, which means that it does not contain any occurrences of the νx operator.
(The latter restriction is not necessary, but simplifies matters and is sufficient for our considerations.) To define the interpretation function I(·) for L ν we must keep track of the variable x. Therefore we first extend the function I(·) on L to a function I(·) : L ν × P(Ω) → P(Ω) by padding it with a dummy argument. We give one clause as an example:
Then we put
and finally define
It is straightforward to see that the restriction to positive in x and ν-free formulae ψ ensures that I(ψ, ·) is a monotonic operator on the powerset P(Ω) of Ω. Hence by Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem I(νx.ψ) is its largest fixpoint.
This language can express Imp. To see this, first notice that common belief is definable in L ν using the νx operator. The analogous characterization of common knowledge is given in Fagin et al. [1995, Section 11.5] .
Note 3. Let ψ be a formula of L and x a variable. Then I(νx. (x ∧ ψ)) is the event that the event I(ψ) is common belief.
Proof. ψ is a formula of L, so x does not occur in ψ. Note that for all F ⊆ Ω we have
where the 'outer' is defined in Subsection 2.3. Hence I( (x ∧ ψ), F ) = squareF ∩ I(ψ), and consequently
where * is defined in Subsection 2.3 and the last equality holds by Note 2. 2
From now on we abbreviate the (well-formed) formula νx. (x ∧ ψ) for ψ being a formula of L to * ψ. So * is a new modality added to the language L ν .
We can also define the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
Note 4. In the game determined by the event I(νx.Ox), every player selects a strategy which survives the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
Proof. We must show the following inclusion:
. So take any j ∈ {1, . . ., n} and any s
By definition for some ω ∈ I(νx.Ox) we have s j (ω) = s ′ j . Then there is some E such that ω ∈ E and E ⊆ I(Ox, E). Therefore for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, φ i (s i (ω), G E ) holds, so in particular φ j (s
Now consider the following formula:
By Notes 3 and 4, we can see that wherever the formula (6) holds, then if it is true common belief that every player is rational, then each player selects a strategy that survives the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
We call an L ν -formula ψ valid if for every belief model (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P 1 , . . ., P n ) for H we have I(ψ) = Ω.
We are now in a position to connect L ν to Imp: the statement Imp asserts that the formula (6) is valid.
In the rest of this section we will discuss a simple proof system in which we can derive (6). This will provide an alternative way of proving the corresponding inclusion in Theorem 1(i).
We will use an axiom and rule of inference for the fixpoint operator taken from Kozen [1983] and one axiom for rationality analogous to the one called in de Bruin [2004] an 'implicit definition' of rationality. We give these in Figure 1 denoting by ψ[x → χ] the formula obtained from ψ by substituting each occurence of the variable x with the formula χ.
Axiom schemata
Figure 1: Proof system P First we establish the soundness of this proof system, that is that its axioms are valid and the proof rules preserve validity.
Lemma 3. The proof system P is sound.
Proof. We show first the validity of the axiom ratDis. Let (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P i , . . ., P n ) be a belief model for H. We must show that I(rat → ( ψ → Oψ)) = Ω. That is, that for any ψ the inclusion I(rat) ∩ I( ψ) ⊆ I(Oψ) holds. So take some ω ∈ I(rat) ∩ I( ψ). Then for every i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, φ i (s i (ω), G P i (ω) ), and
The axioms νDis and the rule νInd were introduced in Kozen [1983] , and their soundness proof is standard. This axiom and the rule formalize, respectively, the following two consequences of Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem concerning a monotonic operator T :
• νT is a post-fixpoint of T , i.e., νT ⊆ T (νT ) holds,
Next, we establish the already announced claim.
Theorem 5. The formula (6) is a theorem of the proof system P.
Proof. The following formula is an instance of the axiom ratDis (with ψ := * rat ∧ rat):
and the following is an instance of νDis (with ψ := (x ∧ rat)):
Putting these two together via some simple propositional logic, we obtain:
This last formula is of the right shape to apply the rule νInd (with χ := * rat ∧ rat and ψ := Ox), to obtain:
which is precisely the formula (6). 2
The derivation of (6) has shown which proof-theoretic principles are sufficient to obtain Theorem 1(i). It is interesting to note that no axioms or rules for the modalities and O were needed in order to derive (6). This corresponds to the fact that in the proof of the corresponding inclusion in Theorem 1(i) we did not use the fact that the possibility correspondences were belief correspondences.
In the language L ν , rat 1 , . . ., rat n are propositional constants. We can define them in terms of the i and O i modalities but to this end we need to extend the language L ν to a second-order one by allowing quantifiers over set variables, so by allowing formulae of the form ∃Xφ. It is clear how to extend the semantics to this larger class of formulae. In the resulting language each rat i constant is definable by a formula of the latter language:
where ∀Xφ is an abbreviation for ¬∃X¬φ.
The following observation then shows correctness of this definition.
Note 5. For all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} the formula (7) is valid. 2
Let us mention that such second-order extensions of propositional modal logics were first considered in Fine [1970] .
To further our syntactic analysis, we now give a language L O which can be used to define and analyze the optimality properties φ i (·, ·). It is a first-order language formed from a family of n ternary relation symbols x ≥ i z y, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, along with the binary relation x ∈ X between a first-order variable and a set variable. L O is given by the following recursive definition:
We use the same abbreviations → and ∨ as above and further abbreviate ¬y ≥ i z x to x > i z y, ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ φ) to ∃x ∈ X φ, ∀x(x ∈ X → φ) to ∀x ∈ X φ, and write ∀xφ for ¬∃x¬φ.
By an optimality condition for player i we now mean a formula containing exactly one free first-order variable and the set variable X, and in which all the occurrences of the atomic formula x ≥ j z y are with j equal to i. In particular, we are interested in the following optimality conditions:
We now give a semantics for L O -formulae in the context of a model (Ω, s 1 , . . . , s n ) for the initial game H. An assignment is a function α that maps each first-order variable to a state in Ω and each set variable to an event in (a subset of) Ω. The semantics is given by a satisfaction relation between an assignment α and a formula φ of L O , with |= α φ meaning that α satisfies φ. This relation is defined as follows:
• |= α φ ∧ ψ iff |= α φ and |= α ψ,
where:
otherwise. This semantics allows us to relate the above six optimality conditions to the corresponding optimality properties that are concerned solely with pure strategies.
Note 6. For each optimality condition φ i , where φ ∈ {sd l , sd g , wd l , wd
2 To relate optimality conditions to monotonic optimality properties we need one more definition. We say that a formula φ of L O is positive just when every occurrence of the set variable X occurs under a positive number of negation signs (¬). So for example the formula br l i (x, X), that is, ∃z ∈ X∀y ∈ Xx ≥ i z y, is not positive, since the second occurrence of X is under one negation sign, while br g i (x, X), that is, ∃z ∈ X∀y x ≥ i z y, is positive. The following observation then links syntactic matters with monotonicity.
Note 7. For every positive optimality condition φ i (x, X) for player i the corresponding property φ i (s i , G) (used by player i) is monotonic. 2 Among the above six optimality conditions only sd g i (x, X) and br g i (x, X) are positive. The corresponding other four properties, as already mentioned earlier, are not monotonic. By the above observation they cannot be defined by positive formulae.
Public announcements
The main result, Theorem 1(i), dealt with the outcome T ∞ φ of the iterated elimination of strategies that for player i are not φ i -optimal, and crucially relied on the assumption that each property φ i is monotonic. However, this outcome exists for arbitrary φ i s. In this section we show that for a large class of properties φ i this outcome can be characterized by means of the concept of a public announcement. This approach, inspired by van Benthem [2007] , applies to all global properties introduced in Section 3, some of which are non-monotonic.
The particular kind of "public announcement" that we will be interested in is a set of true statements, one by each player i to the effect that i will not play any strategy that is not optimal for him, according to his notion of optimality. Note that there is no strategic element to these announcements: the players simply follow a protocol from which they cannot deviate. The announcements are "public" in the sense that every other player hears them as they happen.
The iterated public announcements can be thought of as a process in which the players learn how the game will be played. The limit of this learning process represents the situation in which the announcements lead to no change in the model, at which point it can be said that rationality has been learned by all players. It is in this sense that public announcements provide alternative epistemic foundations for the outcome T ∞ φ . Let us clarify first what we would like to achieve. Consider a model M for the initial game H. The process of iterated elimination of the strategies that are not φ i -optimal, formalized by the iterated applications of the T φ operator, produces a sequence T α φ , where α is an ordinal, of restrictions of H. We would like to mimic it on the side of the models, so that we get a corresponding sequence M α of models of these restrictions. To make this idea work we need to define an appropriate way of reducing models. We take care of it by letting the players repeatedly announce that they only select φ i -optimal strategies. This brings us to the notions of public announcements and their effects on the models.
Given a model M = (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n ) we define
• a public announcement by player i in a model M as an event E in M,
• given a vector E := (E 1 , . . ., E n ) of public announcements by players 1, . . ., n we let
and call it the effect of the public announcements of E on M.
Given a property φ i (·, G) that player i uses to select his strategies in the restriction G of H and a model M := (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n ) for G we define [[φ i ]] as the event in M that player i selects optimally his strategies with respect to G. Formally:
(Note that in the notation of the previous section we have [[φ] 
We want now to obtain the reduction of a model M of G to a model M of T φ (G) by means of the just defined vector [[φ] ] of public announcements.
The effect of the public announcements of E on a model of G should ideally be a model of the restriction G E . Unfortunately, this does not hold in such generality. Indeed, let the two-player game G have the strategy sets G 1 := {U, D}, G 2 := {L, R} and consider the model M for G with Ω := {ω ul , ω dr } and the functions s 1 and s 2 defined by
This simple example is depicted in Figure 2 .
Figure 2: A motivating example for the use of standard models
A remedy lies in restricting one's attention to the standard models. However, in order to find a faithful public announcement analogue to strategy elimination we must also narrow the concept of a public announcement as follows. A proper public announcement by player i in a standard model is a subset of Ω = G 1 ×. . .×G n of the form
So a proper public announcement by a player is an event that amounts to a 'declaration' by the player that he will limit his attention to a subset of his strategies, that is, will discard the remaining strategies. So when each player makes a proper public announcement, their combined effect on the standard model is that the set of states (or equivalently, the set of joint strategies) becomes appropriately restricted. An example, which is crucial for us, of a proper public announcement in a standard model is of course [
The following note links in the desired way two notions we introduced. It states that the effect of the proper public announcements of E on the standard model for G is the standard model for the restriction of G to E.
Note 8. Let M be the standard model for G and E a vector of proper public announcements by players 1, . . ., n in M.
Proof. We only need to check that ∩ n i=1 E i is the set of joint strategies of the restriction G E . But each E i is a proper announcement, so it is of the form
We also have the following observation that links the vector [[φ] ] of public announcements with the operator T φ of Section 3.
Note 9. Let M := (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n ) be the standard model for G. Then
Fix i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Then we have the following string of equivalences:
Denote now by [[φ] ] ∞ the iterated effect of the public announcements of [[φ] ] starting with the standard model for the initial game H. The following conclusion then relates the iterated elimination of the strategies that for player i are not φ i -optimal to the iterated effects of the corresponding public announcements.
Corollary 2. [[φ]]
∞ is the standard model for the restriction T ∞ φ .
Proof. By Notes 8 and 9. 2
Note that in the above corollary each effect of the public announcements of [[φ] ] is considered on a different standard model. Note also that the above result holds for arbitrary properties φ i , not necessarily monotonic ones.
We already mentioned in Section 1 that for various natural properties φ transfinite iterations of T φ may be needed to reach the outcome T ∞ φ . So the same holds for the iterated effects of the corresponding public announcements. It is useful to point out that, as shown in Parikh [1992] a similar situation can arise in case of natural dialogues the aim of which is to reach common knowledge.
This analysis gives an account of public announcements of the optimality of players' strategies. We now extend this analysis to public announcements of rationality. To this end we additionally assume for each player a belief correspondence P i : Ω → P(Ω), that is we consider belief models.
We define then the event of player i being φ i -rational in the restriction G as φ i := {ω ∈ Ω | φ i (s i (ω), G P i (ω) )}.
(Note that in the notation of the previous section we have φ i = I(rat i ).) Again we abbreviate ( φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) to φ . Note that φ depends on the underlying belief model (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P 1 , . . ., P n ) and on G.
We extend the definition of the effect of the public announcements E := (E 1 , . . ., E n ) to belief models in the natural way, by restricting each possibility correspondence to the intersection of the events in E:
[E](M, P 1 , . . ., P n ) = ([E]M,
This definition is in the same spirit as in Plaza [1989] and in Osborne and Rubinstein [1994, page 72] , where it is used in the analysis of the puzzle of the hats.
We aim to find a class of belief models for which, under a mild restriction on the properties φ i , φ ∞ , the iterated effect of the public announcements of φ starting with the standard belief model for the initial game H, will be the standard belief model for T ∞ φ . We will therefore use a natural choice of possibility correspondences, which we call the standard possibility correspondences:
By the standard knowledge model for a restriction G we now mean the standard model for G endowed with the standard possibility correspondences.
The following observation holds.
Note 10. Consider the standard knowledge model (Ω, s 1 , . . ., s n , P 1 , . . ., P n ) for a restriction G := (G 1 , . . ., G n ) of H and a state ω ∈ Ω. Then
Proof. Immediate by the fact that in the standard knowledge model for each possibility correspondence we have
Intuitively, this observation states that in each state of a standard knowledge model each player knows his own choice of strategy but knows nothing about the strategies of the other players. So standard possibility correspondences represent the beliefs of each player after he has privately selected his strategy but no information between the players has been exchanged. It is in that sense that the standard knowledge models are natural. In van Benthem [2007] in effect only such models are considered.
A large class of properties φ i satisfy the following restriction:
A For all G := (G 1 , . . . , G n ) and
That restriction on the properties φ i is sufficient to obtain the following analogue of Corollary 2 for the case of public announcements of rationality. Proof. Notice that it suffices to prove for each restriction G the following statement for each i:
Indeed, (8) entails that φ i = [[φ i ]], in which case the result follows from Corollary 2 and the observation that the possibility correspondences are restricted in the appropriate way.
But (8) is a direct consequence of the assumption of A and of Note 10. 2
To see the consequences of the above result note that A holds for each global property sd
